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I read the materials from the symposium with eagerness; like many
others, I tend to be excited by the opportunity to view legal questions
through the eyes of those with different training than mine. Both the
humanities and the social sciences have proven to offer a great deal to
those who wish to enrich their understanding of law as a discipline of
ideas. With this favorable disposition I embarked on the task of reading
what the linguists had to say about interpretation. Soon and persistently,
however, a question interrupted the flow of my reading, a question whose
tenacity and salience I had not anticipated; it is this question that I would
like to address in these brief remarks.
The question I pose for those who have devoted considerable effort to
the project is why linguistics should have anything to offer those who
would interpret legal texts. An answer to the question requires both an
understanding of what linguistics is and a theory for why it might
illuminate areas of interest for us. Through the materials of the symposium
I believe I have acquired a reasonably accurate, if limited, understanding
of the linguist's enterprise, but nowhere in the materials have I found help
with the theoretical problem.
I gather that what linguistics (at least the branch of the discipline that is
represented in this collection) primarily offers is an empirically supportable
and refined way to assess how "ordinary people" (I admit that I have some
difficulty in discerning which segment of the American populace is covered
by this term) understand certain uses of language. They can help us
consider, for example, how an ordinary person would understand a sign
banning vehicles from the park. Through introspection, examining actual
uses of language or polling members of the community, linguists can offer
an informed judgment as to possible interpretations that most people would
ascribe to a given expression. They can identify whether most people would
understand an utterance in the same manner, whether people would differ
in their understanding (i.e., whether the expression is ambiguous), or
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whether people would attribute a precise understanding to the words at
issue (i.e., whether the expression is vague). I imagine this type of expertise
could be of invaluable assistance in drafting jury instructions, warning
labels, or consumer contracts designed to be intelligible to individu-
als-informing those who communicate to the populace so that their
communications accurately reflect their intended message.
This speaks not at all, however, to the task of interpreting language once
it has become part of a legal text. If the legal community were to accept
the proposition that all statutes, regulations, and constitutions should be
interpreted and applied as the common person would understand them, then
the linguists would appropriately be the reference resource to which all
would turn in determining what that understanding would be in each case.
But the premise simply is not even close to true. Unless we are willing to
abandon the vehement theoretical debates that have surrounded interpreta-
tion in favor of this simple (and at least at first blush unsustainable) rule,
then the value of linguistics to the interpretative task is not established.
What was lacking from the discussion at the symposium, I felt, was an
effort to grapple with the problem of establishing that value.
The question, then, is whether linguistics can bring to interpretation what
other disciplines have usefully contributed to other aspects of the study of
law. In the early days of law and economics, some horrified purists thought
that economists would simply draw graphs to determine the answers to
moral questions, and this caused much distress among those who thought
the discipline of economics had nothing to offer to the law. As the law and
economics school and the rest of the legal community have matured,
however, it has become clear that economics is not going to profess to
answer questions such as whether the death penalty is morally justified or
whether the Constitution protects a right to privacy. But it can usefully be
used to shed light on how people behave under certain conditions, how
they make choices, and how they are affected by legal rules. This assistance
has proved invaluable to those who strive to develop the law informed by
its likely consequences.
Similarly, psychology and philosophy have contributed to the lawyers'
understanding of individuals and governments by providing insights into
the theory and consequences of law. Principles borrowed from psychology
help legal academics understand important relationships in the law, such as
that of lawyer to client or prisoner to prosecutor, and the way people
process information, which often departs from the rational actor model
which dominates economics. Philosophy, of course, greatly influences




interpretation, however, there is no automatic relevance of a philosophical
principle to a legal question; the importation into law of the moral or
philosophical conclusions of others must be justified in each instance. "We
like Rawls, you like Nozick. We win, 6-3." Ely's famous example
illustrates just this problem.' And thus it is not clear to me why we should
look to linguistics for help with legal interpretation. Stated differently, what
makes linguistics relevant to the legal task of interpreting statutes,
regulations and constitutions?
Indeed, I found it interesting that although the symposium ostensibly was
addressed to legal interpretation of statutes and the Constitution (I assume
that regulatory interpretation was subsumed in the former), the use of
linguistics in constitutional interpretation was by and large ignored. If
anything, it strikes me that a constitution is-and should be-more likely
to be written in conventional language than is a statute. Yet my sense is
that few would argue strenuously for a theory of constitutional interpreta-
tion inextricably tied to linguistic analysis. If we are not willing to link our
governing charter to the conventional understanding of the words it
contains, why should we do so with statutory interpretation?
In searching for an answer to this question, I thought of two reasons why
a legal interpreter might decide, as a matter of theory, to turn to a linguist
for assistance. One would be that those who drafted the text in question
were writing in ordinary language, and they wished their document to be
interpreted by such means. The second would be that, as a matter of legal
policy, the interpreter had a preference for interpretations that comport with
the ordinary understanding of the words at issue, as opposed to any
specialized understanding which she might, consciously or unconsciously,
bring to bear upon the text in question. The difference between these two
reasons is that the first is based on the preference of the drafters of the text
for common understanding, a preference that the interpretator respects,
while the second is based on the preference of the interpreter.
I do not think that these two reasons are inevitably tied to any current
theory of statutory interpretation. Either or both could bb present in
intentionalism (where the interpreter tries to discern the intent of those who
created the text), purposivism (where the interpreter assigns to ambiguous
language the interpretation that best furthers the goal of the statute or
constitution), textualism (where the interpreter follows the interpretation
that seems most faithful to the language of the text), dynamic interpretation
I. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DismusT: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 58 (1980).
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(where the court gives greater weight to intervening events as time passes),
or any other theory of interpretation. To varying degrees, all of these
theories wrestle with the language of the statute; but they may assess that
language in a manner that differs from the ordinary understanding. In
particular, they may read the language on the page in the context of their
own legal-as opposed to conventional-understandings. Thus, simply
adopting one of the many proffered theories of legal interpretation neither
mandates nor precludes the use of linguistics. The question must be met on
its own terms.
In assessing the potential contributions that linguistics could make to the
interpretative endeavor, it is necessary to spell out what it means to reject
conventional understanding. Put differently, what is the distinction between
conventional understanding and legal understanding? Linguistics, its
practitioners assert, provides a scientific method for uncovering the
conventional understanding of language. If judges desired to interpret
statutes solely in accord with such measures, the case for linguistics is
easily made. Of course, this assumes that linguists will reach agreement on
the meaning of any given text. If in fact linguists often disagree, then
importing linguistics into law will simply add to the battle of experts that
already pervades many legal disputes. Even if there is moderate disagree-
ment amongst linguists, however, it is still the case that judges cannot
outperform them in this area. To reject the assistance offered by linguistics,
it is necessary to identify an area in which judges have a comparative
advantage.
Judges are conversant in the lawyer's vernacular. It is this training on
which they draw in reading a statute. Lawyers do not speak a foreign
language. Rather, they use english, but they have their own dialect. This
dialect is not, however, some attempt to arbitrarily confound nonlawyers.
Lawyers have not taken the individual words from the english language and
given them meanings which the general populace cannot comprehend.
Hence, Justice Scalia's insistence on looking at dictionaries does not
necessarily imply that he would consign the interpretative task to linguists.
Rather, it is the nature of the utterances which differ between legal english
and conventional english. In particular, the texts which lawyers create and
interpret have no counterpart in the larger society. Statutes are complex
creations. It often surprises entering students that legal education by and
large is not designed to convey the substance of the law to them. We do
not seek to turn them into supercomputers who can spew out an answer for
any given problem. Rather, we attempt to teach them the process of




This component takes a significant amount of time to learn. Students
have to learn to focus on the precise words before them, and also to have
some sense of how statutes operate in our legal system. This understanding
of the function of statutes leads to certain background norms which lawyers
bring with them when they read statutes. Some of these norms are
controversial, others not. As to the controversial norms, the disputes stem
from differing conceptions of the appropriate judicial role in the interpreta-
tive process. Nevertheless, it is the nature of the enterprise that distinguish-
es legal understanding from conventional understanding. The question thus
becomes, when asked to interpret a statute, should judges turn to linguists
for conventional understanding, or to their own introspection for legal
understanding.
As to the first reason why conventional understanding should be
controlling-that those drafting the document in question desired the
document they produced to be interpreted in such a manner-it is
unfounded both as a matter of current practice and as one of theory. Few
would suggest that many, let alone most, of the statutes drafted today are
designed to be read by the ordinary person. As every law professor knows,
students have to be taught how to read statutes. Their natural ability with
conventional language simply does not equip them to parse existing laws.
Thus, one cannot base the case for linguistics on current legislative
practice.
As a normative matter, one might assert, that it would be desirable for
all legal texts to be readily comprehensible to the general populace. Indeed,
it was just this thought that gave rise to the Plain English movement. Its
goal of creating law readily accessible to the average person is one I, and
I would think most people, favor. Certainly the premise of the move-
ment-that many statutes are poorly drafted, regardless of whether they are
read in light of conventional understandings of language or legal under-
standings of language-is accurate. The legislative process is too often a
last minute affair that leaves little time for careful drafting of statutory
language. This type of confusion has little to commend it. To the extent
that linguists, or anyone for that matter, could assist legislators and their
staffs in avoiding careless mistakes and needless verbosity, I am all in favor
of the project. Statutes should be as clear and as well written as possible.
Before we translate this goal into an agenda for rewriting the entire corpus
of American law, however, we should attempt to understand why our
current laws have departed from conventional language. To be sure, one
could tell a public choice story about the legal cabal attempting to
maximize their own profits by passing opaque laws. These impenetrable
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texts force people to hire lawyers to unlock their secrets.
Yet the existence of statutory language which departs from convention
cannot be attributed solely to such rent-seeking behavior. The nature of the
law itself, and the way in which law is filtered down to individual members
of society, dictates that there be a high degree of complexity and specializa-
tion in the statutory realm. Indeed, the task of drafting a statute is such that
it is almost inevitable that the final product is not going to be easily
understood by nonlawyers, regardless of how careful one is to ensure that
legal understandings of language do not creep into the process.
The reasons why statutes end up being drafted according to the
conventions of lawyers can best be demonstrated by considering the
problems that would confront nonlawyers if we were to enact statutes
written in conventional language. The homey example of "No vehicles in
the park" bears little resemblance to the statutes that confront today's
lawyers. More realistic examples can be found in many areas, one of
which, being familiar to me, I will use to illustrate: corporate bankruptcy
law. There is nothing magical about bankruptcy law; my guess would be
that in terms of complexity, it is no more byzantine than most areas
covered by statutes. Indeed, given that the Bankruptcy Code is the product
of a Bankruptcy Commission whose mission was to write a comprehensive
statutory scheme, it may be more coherent than other statutory schemes.
The goals of a corporate bankruptcy proceeding, in short, are to resolve
the competing claims to a debtor's assets and to decide whether or not the
debtor should be maintained as an ongoing firm. Let's assume that a group
of linguists got together with lawyers and attempted to draft a new
Bankruptcy Code which in plain prose set forth bankruptcy law in a way
that nonlawyers could understand. It is highly unlikely that they could
achieve any degree of success, especially because the Code is only part of
a broader context that renders it meaningful. A reasonably detailed
understanding of state debt collection law, for example, is necessary to
grasp the effect of many provisions that one finds in the Code. Moreover,
the provisions for court-supervised reorganizations are complex. It is thus
not at all certain that one could write a Bankruptcy Code that would be
transparent to everyone.
Putting this objection to one side, however, the question still remains,
what would be gained by writing a Bankruptcy Code for the masses?
Would it, in any meaningful sense, make the law more accessible to those
affected by it? Probably not. Financial distress tends to be an infrequent
event for most firms. They thus have little reason to invest resources in




Once the managers of the firm realize that the firm is in financial distress
and wish to investigate the possibility of filing for bankruptcy, they have
one of two options. They could either have an existing employee read the
conventional meaning Bankruptcy Code or they could hire someone who
is already familiar with it. The odds are that they would take the latter
route.
The main reason for this choice is that bankruptcy law, like most law,
is more than a matter of understanding the statutes which set forth the
governing rules. It is also a matter of experience. Even when lawyers agree
on what the law means, the choice of lawyers is significant. The difference
between an effective lawyer and an ineffective one is the extent to which
the lawyer could use the law to assist her client. Many actions taken in a
bankruptcy proceeding are done for strategic reasons. For example, an
experienced lawyer may counsel a creditor not to file a claim against
debtor. Why? One would think that a creditor would always try to collect
on money that it is owed. Expertise, however, adds a level of complexity
to the analysis. The creditor may have received a payment immediately
prior to the filing for bankruptcy, which the trustee would seek to recover
as a preference. Under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Seventh
Amendment, if the creditor does not file a claim in bankruptcy, it is entitled
to a jury trial on the preference issue, most likely in the district court. If it
does file a claim, its constitutional right to a jury trial vanishes, and the
preference issue will be resolved by the bankruptcy judge. Given the
backlog of jury cases in most district courts, the creditor may desire to keep
its right to a jury trial. It can use the threat of delay to reach a more
favorable settlement from the trustee. The threat of delay may be more
valuable than the foregone claim. Thus, regardless of the style in which the
Bankruptcy Code is written, those entities involved in a bankruptcy
proceeding are likely to turn to experts for advice.
This need for specialization, regardless of the clarity of statutory
language, exists throughout the law. We live in a complex, regulatory state.
Drafting statutes in language that could be understood by all would not
necessarily reduce this complexity. Simply because a statute is written in
conventional language does not mean that the law is accessible in a
meaningful sense. Tax law, at least with its present complexity, requires a
mediator between the text and the individual. Bringing a conventional
understanding approach to text as complex as most of today's statutes will
not allow the nonlawyer to unlock their mysteries.
Once we recognize that legal experts will exist, one comes to the
conclusion that the law should be written with them in mind. Specialized
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dialects exist in many areas of life, from the military to academic
disciplines to manufacturing. Part of this specialization may be due to a
socialization process, as a way to distinguish outsiders from members of the
community. Yet such specialization also results from the fact that it reduces
transaction costs. It allows for easier communication between those who are
steeped in the activity. Law, given its inevitable complexity, is thus going
to require specialization, which in turn is going to lead to the development
of a legal dialect. Thus, one cannot support writing statutes in conventional
language on the ground that this would be a more effective way of
communicating the content of legal rules to the citizenry. This conclusion
removes the most likely reason for using linguistics in statutory interpreta-
tion-that the search for ordinary understanding is faithful to the wishes of
the drafters.
One might object that accepting the current complexity and specialization
of the law consigns the ordinary person to legal ignorance. After all, most
individuals cannot afford an attorney to help them navigate through the
United States Code. One response to this concern is that this problem is
inevitable. Indeed, I would be surprised if any western democracy had laws
which could be easily understood by the majority of citizens. A more
satisfying response is that this problem is ameliorated through a number of
measures. One method is that government often attempts to translate laws
to the specific persons to whom they are targeted. The most notable
example of this is the federal income tax form, but other examples abound.
Regulatory agencies often spend significant resources to ensure that the
average person can, without legal assistance, learn the law as it applies to
them. By and large, most people can muddle through with the help of the
bureaucratic mediator.
A second response to the problem of legal complexity and specialization
is the market. People often want to know the contours of their legal rights,
but cannot afford the services of a high-priced law firm. It is thus not
surprising that there are now low-priced attorneys for routine affairs.
Similarly, there are a number of books on any given area to apprise persons
as to their legal rights. There are even computer programs which help
people fill out their taxes and write their wills. Indeed, at least in terms of
tax software, there is an annual battle over which program can be the most
comprehensive and yet user friendly. The market, which responds better to
the preferences of individuals than does the government, provides
meaningful access to many otherwise inaccessible legal rules.
There is thus no reason that legislatures will or even should draft statutes




to linguistic analysis on this basis. Even recognizing this to be the case, one
might argue that courts should nevertheless turn to linguists. Courts that
adopt this approach would do so not because they are attempting to discern
what the language meant to those who drafted it. Rather, they would be
asserting that there is a value in reading statutes as if they were drafted in
conventional terms.
This judicial preference for having conventional understanding trump
legal understanding would be difficult to justify. If the legislature has
cogent reasons for drafting statutes steeped in legal convention, it is hard
to imagine why these reasons would not apply to the judicial branch as
well. The inevitable specialization of law leads to statutes drafted in light
of legal understandings. No conception of the role of judges in interpreting
statutes would suggest that judges would turn a blind eye to this prevailing
practice and engage in the fiction that statutes are written in the same
manner as is the daily newspaper.
The one exception that might be proffered is that of criminal law.
Indeed, Professor Cunningham's suggestion that conventional understanding
be the interpretative baseline is limited to this area. Before evaluating this
suggestion, we have to ask why criminal law is different from civil law. It
cannot be the case that criminal law is more likely to be read by the
average person before engaging in questionable activity than is civil law.
No one believes that most criminals actually consult the Statutes at Large
before embarking on illicit conduct. We would be surprised to see
defendants attempting to avoid punishment by claiming that they read the
law at issue and believed that it did not cover their activity. Nevertheless,
our intuitions are that there is something different about criminal law,
something that requires more clarity than does civil law.
I share this intuition, and I think that it stems from two sources. The first
is that it strikes us as unfair that someone would be punished for an act
which they could not have learned was illegal. We do not punish persons
who had no ability to control their actions; similarly, we are uneasy about
punishing persons who had no opportunity to learn that their conduct is
prohibited. But again this begs the question of what counts as accessible.
Criminal laws can be every bit as complex as civil laws. Certainly many
environmental, money laundering and securities law crimes involve what
appears to the ordinary person as bewildering levels of complexity. For
these laws, assiduously following conventional language provides no
assurance that they will be readily understood by the nonlawyer. We are
thus not surprised that numerous lawyers specialize in these areas and many
nonlawyers seek professional advice before they tread too close to the line.
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As with civil law, specialization is inevitable.
The second reason for our added concerns with transparency in the
criminal law is that we want to ensure that the legal system is not depriving
people of their liberty simply because either the judge or the jury views
them as undesirable. Clarity provides a check against arbitrary
decisionmaking. This goal does not solve the puzzle of whether linguistics
can be relevant to legal interpretation. We still have to ask the question of
clarity to whom? Lawyers are far more likely than average citizens to be
monitors of the legal system. If the legal system demands that a statutory
prohibition be clear to this relatively large class of people (which it does),
the evils generated by granting greater discretion to judges and juries to
create new offenses will not come to pass. Criminal law thus does not offer
a home to linguistics any more than does civil law.
In the end, the discussion at the symposium was captivating, and I
learned a lot about linguistics, a subject that I have always wanted to know
more about. My disappointment was only that I did not learn anything
more about law.
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